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Towards General Spatial Intelligence
Vlad Tanasescu and John Domingue1
Abstract.
The goal of General Spatial Intelligence is to present a unified
theory to support the various aspects of spatial experience, whether
physical or cognitive. We acknowledge the fact that GIScience has to
assume a particular worldview, resulting from specific positions re-
garding metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, mind, language, cog-
nition and representation. Implicit positions regarding these domains
may allow solutions to isolated problems but often hamper a more
encompassing approach. We argue that explicitly defining a world-
view allows the grounding and derivation of multi-modal models,
establishing precise problems, allowing falsifiability. We present an
example of such a theory founded on process metaphysics, where the
ontological elements are called differences. We show that a world-
view has implications regarding the nature of space and, in the case
of the chosen metaphysical layer, favours a model of space as true
spacetime, i.e. four-dimensionality. Finally we illustrate the approach
using a scenario from psychology and AI based planning.
1 INTRODUCTION
Is there a common denominator to the way we think about our spa-
tial environment (representation), the way we find our way around
(orientation, way-finding), our subjective experience of the external
world (sense of place) or the way we coordinate our most common as
well as more precise movements (mobility, manipulation)? We call
any theory that attempts to unify these various experiences of space
a theory of General Spatial Intelligence (GSI)2. By limiting intelli-
gence to its spatial aspects we exclude non spatial activities such as
writing a piece of music or reading a page of Tolstoy. However it is
reasonable to think that a theory explaining spatial experience would
fit nicely into any theory of general intelligence.
A basic use case that illustrates several “attitudes” toward space
is an extended version of the “changing a light bulb” scenario. The
original use case originates in the literature on ad-hoc categories [2]
[3] whilst a modified version has recently been introduced in GISc3
[12]. It involves an intelligent agent having to change a light bulb in
an office room using the various elements available. We slightly ex-
tend the use case by introducing the activation of a switch before re-
alizing that the bulb is faulty (as an element of manipulation), as well
as the need to go to another room to get another bulb (orientation).
We will demonstrate that even the cognitive operations involved in
this scenario can be a part of a theory of GSI.
As “intelligent” natural agents, we do not only evolve in space
and time but also reflect about them. To represent space, i.e. to com-
municate about it in a uniform way through formal (mathematic) or
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informal (natural language) means, we use distinct knowledge repre-
sentation models. GIScience (or GISc) is the science of spatial rep-
resentation [15]. To achieve geographic representation, and describe
generic notions such as place [4] [14], or to handle precise prob-
lems such as land cover [1], GISc has witnessed the use of logic
based ontologies, multi-representation models, image schemata, af-
fordances or conceptual spaces. Moreover, the formalisms used range
from mainstream programming languages and algebraic techniques,
to functional or logical formalisms. Also, beside variations of mod-
els and formalisms at the representation level, spatial knowledge is
acquired, experienced and shared at levels that can be, for example
computational, cognitive, or supported by language.
These various dimensions of GIScience investigation consume
theories – or “organized systems of accepted knowledge that apply in
a variety of circumstances to explain a specific set of phenomena”4
– to produce implicit or explicit models, or “hypothetical [and sim-
plified] descriptions of a complex entity or process” 5. Rather than
questioning the validity of these approaches we believe that an at-
tempt should be made to ground them in an underlying theory of
General Spatial Intelligence. Indeed, without an underlying theory,
the juxtaposition of models and domains to describe the experience
of space gives the unsatisfactory appearance of a “collage”. Whether
a unified theory is indeed possible is, of course, a research issue be-
yond the scope of this paper.
The term general in GSI does by no means mean universal, but
simply underlines the aim of being as encompassing as possible. In-
deed a theory of GSI needs to aim for universality in order not to
exclude aspects of the GISc worldview from the start. Therefore GSI
can be defined negatively as a) the rejection of any theory of space
that describes only one aspect of spatial experience and b) the rejec-
tion of any theory that does not make all (or at least several) aspects
of a worldview explicit. The advantages of a GSI theory are twofold:
1. Grounding: an underlying theory provides a justification for a par-
ticular model produced or used;
2. Fundational: an underlying theory, if deemed general, allows to
develop new models based on the assumption that they should
match the underlying.
To use a metaphor, an underlying theory can be compared to the
bottom of a swimming pool, that can be used either to rest when tired
of swimming or as a support to bounce without much effort toward
new locations.
We will start by presenting Raper’s account of worldviews in
GISc, and augment it with the notion of poles. We will then pro-
vide a description of the representation layer and suggest that GSI
cannot be achieved at this layer only. We will then make the meta-
physical layer explicit, using an instance of process philosophy. The
4 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=theory
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notion of poles will be used to describe and apply constraints on the
notions of space, mind, language and agency. Finally we will apply
the resulting theory to a version of the changing a light bulb use case.
2 WORLDVIEWS
As Thomas Kuhn quoted by Raper describes it “a worldview can be
seen as a set of assumptions and commitments to which a ’research
progamme’ subscribes” [15] (p. 5). Still according to Raper [15], a
worldview is composed of at least these fundamental issues:
• Metaphysics: the theoretical grounding and conceptualisation of
the notion of ‘world’ employed;
• Ontology: the approaches by which the contents of the conceptu-
alisation of the world are defined, ordered and signified;
• Epistemology: the procedures by which knowledge of the concep-
tualised world is established and evaluated;
• Philosophy of Mind: the nature of human knowledge of the con-
ceptualised world;
• Linguistics: the nature of language and its role in communication
and the construction of meaning;
• Cognitive Science: theories and models of cognition, including
perception, the nature of intelligence and the functioning of the
mind; and
• Representation: the nature of computation employing symbolic
and informational representations of human knowledge
Most investigations in the spatial domain leave one or several of
these aspects implicit, providing theories for only a few of them,
without acknowledging the importance of the others. This situation
is not restricted to GIScience but we believe that making explicit
statements about these issues would provide multiple advantages, no-
tably:
• Completeness: the aim of a theory of GSI would be to be compre-
hensive, at least teleologically, i.e. aim to eventually explain all of
spatial experience, subjective and objective;
• Incremental Progress: with a theory aiming for completeness, the
results to specific problems could be tied to the underlying theory
and hence reflected in other models;
• Falsifiability: one would be able to define precise problems against
which the theory could be tested;
• Modelisation: a well defined theory would allow derivative mod-
els, i.e. simplifications of subsets of a theory, without giving the
impression of a collage;
• Philosophical Jackpot: finally, the possibility exists that such a
structure of interdependent elements, modified and completed by
new problems, achieves some new representational power, allow-
ing for example embodied mechanical agents to reach a level of
agency that could be qualified as Artificial General Spatial Intelli-
gence.
Elements of a worldview follow a layered structure, rooted in
metaphysics and ontology and leading to representation through the
layers of epistemology, language, mind, etc. [15]. However, in a the-
ory of General Spatial Intelligence, not only should worldview lay-
ers interact with each other but they are also required to be mutually
consistent and reducible to each other. Indeed a successful descrip-
tion of the sense of place for example, seems very unlikely without
any reference to mind, language and cognition. In the same way a
theory of mobility that does not corroborate physical laws would be
easily falsified. Moreover, one should be able to describe KR mod-
els in terms of language or cognitive features, in the same way as,
for example, a high level programming language can be expressed in
low level binary operations. Notably, as we aim for completeness, we
should strive to establish a link between the two poles constituted by
the representation layer and the metaphysical one. These links, when
established will contribute to the orientation of all other layers, sim-
ilarly to the poles of a magnet with iron filings but in both directions
(cf. Figure 1), even if layers are not absolutely equivalent and that
the transitions may loose some specificity6.
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OntologyEpistemology
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Figure 1. Worldview and Worldview Poles
The truth of statements about any of the layers is not a concern
here, as truth itself is considered to be a part of the worldview (origi-
nating in the epistemological layer). This approach could be qualified
of postmodern, as it assumes that science, being the conjunction of
knowledge and truth, may be, at least in parts, dependent of the so-
cial and historical processes in which it evolves. However we believe
that the advantages of a theory of GSI can satisfy non postmodern
adopters as well, who should feel free to propose a worldview satys-
fying the constraitns of GSI and dee it true and absolute, as long as
it provides the same explanatory power.
3 A WORDLVIEW POLES FOR GSI
Representation of spatial experience, the aim of GIScience, and one
of the poles we identified in a worldview, is confronted to issues re-
garding what Knowledge Representation (KR) model is appropriate
to a given situation. Whereas any representation is ungrounded with-
out an underlying layer, which can be ultimately grounded by meta-
physics.
3.1 Representation: at Worldview’s End
In order to describe different domains, various KR models has been
advocated in GIScience. To our knowledge, these models all fit in the
categories of logic based ontologies, affordances, image schemata,
conceptual spaces and multi representation. Each of these models
have specific components that are used to describe aspects of spatial
knowledge:
• Logic based ontologies describe a domain using categories and by
defining relations between them. Categories have attributes and
are related by is-a relationships to form taxonomies. Instances
6 Or, as Gilles Deleuze puts it, “Philosophy can speak of science only by
allusion, and science can speak of philosophy only as of a cloud.” [5]
are individuals belonging to a category. Moreover, some ontology
languages provide procedures, functions, axioms and (production)
rules.
• Multi representation models promote the notion of context-
dependent identity. Instead of linking an entity to a unique set of
categories with fixed sets of attributes, multiple representations
are provided depending on the context. These representations are
not only visual (e.g. an airport being represented geometrically as
a point at world scale and a complex structure at a closer scale)
but also concerns the attributes, which can change depending on
the particular representation dictated by the context [24].
• Conceptual spaces, as introduced by Gardenfors [8], present indi-
viduals as points in geometric multi dimensional quality spaces.
As an example, a particular colour is represented as a point in the
three dimensions of the primary colours. This representation al-
lows to easily measure similarity between two individuals as the
distance between two individual points.
• Image schemata are described as “a small number of parts and
relations, by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely many
perceptions, images, and events” [13], and are basically a set of
structures which support relations. Examples are container, bal-
ance, compulsion, blockage, counterforce, etc. Schemas can be
combined to create complex structures. For example a crossroad
is composed of two paths, which are themselves based on the im-
age schemata link and support.
• Affordances are the constitutive concept of ecological psychology
[9]: they are possibilities for action latent in an environment. As
actions have to be carried by someone, the users’ capabilities have
an important role in the definition of an affordance (e.g. a wall
does not afford to be climbed if I am not tall or fit enough or do
not have a ladder).
If these paradigms seem to be superficially compatible (e.g. quale
in DOLCE [7] are inspired by conceptual spaces) only minimal parts
of each model can be mapped to another one and integrations tends
to disregard the specificities of the paradigm (Gibson’s affordances
for example, are often assimilated to functions, or their meaning is
limited to an HCI environment, or the concept of direct perception
is disregarded). Therefore KR models are often used in isolation (e.g
conceptual spaces in [16] or in [1]) which reveals their expressive
limits. As an example, it is indeed quite difficult to emulate is-a hier-
archies with conceptual spaces. Moreover, some statements are sim-
ply not understandable without an underlying theoretical layer: for
example direct perception in ecological psychology, the theory that
affordances are perceived without the mediation of reasoning.
Incompatibilities between KR models are summarized in Figure
2. Hence we believe these incompatibilities between representation
models are fundamental and cannot be solved at the representation
layer. Each KR model expresses different aspects of underlying lay-
ers, in which radically different elements are at work: indeed affor-
dances are not functions, and classes/categories are not prototypes,
although they may provide approximations for each other.
Since KR models are essentially irreconcilable, there is a need to
establish a grounding at a lower level. As our aim is GSI, i.e. trying
to explain spatial cognitive and language related attitudes as well,
we will make an attempt to find this foundation at the lower possible
layer, i.e. the opposite pole, by introducing a metaphysics able to
explain these differences.
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Figure 2. Knowledge Representation in GIScience
4 Metaphysics For GSI
Metaphysics seeks to answer questions about the ultimate nature of
reality. Classical KR has been grounded on an (often implicit) meta-
physical framework that places emphasis on things and substance.
Such a metaphysical layer favours KR models based on identity, cat-
egories and attributes [18]. However, to ground a theory of GSI, the
metaphysics we choose should provide a grounding for the different
KR models, as well as guidelines for the other layers constituting the
worldview. Given the nature of geographic space any metaphysics
that aims to be relevant to GSI should at least display the following
characteristics:
• Granularity: ability to explain the diversity of the KR models used
in GISc;
• Process Friendly: many geographical objects, for example those
represented as fields (e.g. the weather), are procedural by nature,
and therefore a GSI metaphysics should be able to account for
processes; and
• Failability: issues of vagueness remind us that the conceptualiza-
tion of geographic space is somehow subjective, and therefore the
metaphysical should explain this difficulty.
In the next section we propose an instance of process metaphysics
displaying these characteristics.
4.1 Process Metaphysics and Differences
Process metaphysics identifies metaphysical reality with change and
dynamism. As opposed to philosophies that posit an eternal truth at
their core, process metaphysics defines the ultimate nature of reality
as transformation and change itself. At a basic level, process meta-
physics states that everything is a process, in movement, and that
what we recognize as stable, only displays the relative stability of
processes continuously acting to ‘keep it together’. Hence if at the
ultimate level everything is a process, the reality is indistinct, pure
process flux, pure activity. Variants of this have been advocated from
Heraclitus of Ephesus (b. ca. 540 B.C.) teaching that panta rhei (“ev-
erything flows”) to Friederich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Alfred N.
Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze.
In previous work, using only the notion of process, we have intro-
duced differences as the ultimate element, not of reality (as process
are in process metaphysics), but of meaning [19]. Indeed, positing
that everything is a process implies that processes process other pro-
cesses, and by doing so, as a side effect, that some processes become
isolated from the undiferenciated flux of activity that constitutes re-
ality, starting to “make sense”. We call these processes differences. A
difference is any process isolated by another process: it has a mean-
ing by itself, but, being a process, can also be reduced to the differ-
ences/processes they are linked to. For example particular colours,
shapes, a distinct word, a sound, an action, an event, a town, exhibit
meanings I can grasp immediately if I have access to the appropriates
processes to understand them, i.e. if these particular processes are
part of the process that constitutes my individuality. However they
can still be reduced to other differences that in some contexts may
be called parts (e.g. for a ‘building’) or relations (e.g. for a ‘word’).
Therefore differences are anything that makes sense by being isolated
from the background by an actual process. Unlike symbols, differ-
ences are grounded as they cannot be dissociated from the processes
that allow them to signify. Symbols become differences as soon they
are recognized as meaningful.
4.2 Language and Representation
Differences produce meaning, without consideration to any particu-
lar KR. This is reminiscent of collaborative tagging in Web 2.0 appli-
cations, in which users are given absolute freedom in the elicitation
of a label, or tag, independently of any pre-established categorisa-
tion, or indeed preexisting KR model. In this sense, collaborative
tagging systems are expressions of pure meaning, as differences. Ex-
treme Tagging Systems (ETS) are an attempt to generalize the use
of collaborative tagging systems, to match the theory of differences
[21]. Indeed, in ETS tags themselves can be tagged, as well as the
relations between them. For example, if a representation of a car is
tagged with “car”, “car” itself can be tagged with “wheels” and the
relationship between the two with, for example, the tag “part-of”.
These operations can be done collaboratively by multiple users on
the same tag network, or individually on one’s own tag network. In
brief ETS are semantic networks with no particular constraints on the
vocabulary during the creation phase. However control mechanisms
can be applied to the tagging operation itself, in the form of annota-
tions (ratings, descriptions, etc). We have shown elsewhere [20] that
ETS can be mapped to KR models, using for example a lexicon to
find categories and affordances in the tags, in order to define the no-
tion of place. Therefore we have a means to reach the representation
layer from the metaphysical one. However, we are still lacking es-
sential notions of GISc, such as space, and agency.
4.3 Space and Agency
The definition of space provides a perfect example of the applica-
tion of the interaction between representation and metaphysics (il-
lustrated in Figure 1). Indeed, in order establish a theory of GSI we
should ponder if there is a need to introduce an independent con-
cept of space, or if the underlying metaphysics already provide some
useful abstractions that may support spatial representations. More-
over, for GSI, any notion of space should be linked to a notion of
agency, i.e. become an environment for an agent. In this case, is there
a need to introduce the complex collage usually characteristic of de-
scriptions of agency (and start articulating concepts such as “plans”,
“desires”, “beliefs”, “goals”, etc.)?
If we answer the first question by stating that space should indeed
be derived from the metaphysical layer, and allow differences at the
representation layer, there are now two constraints that it should fol-
low:
1. Procedural aspect: a metaphysic based on processes strongly sug-
gests that time should be integrated with space in order to allow
the natural execution of processes;
2. Differential aspect: we conceive differences between spaces ac-
cording to the context, and therefore a representation of space
should naturally adapt to these differences.
We believe that process metaphysics provides sufficient grounding
for a notion of space supporting agency in a natural way. Indeed so-
called “true spacetime” [6], i.e. an eternalist and perdurantist view
of space [17], allows the representation of processes as timespace
worms, i.e. 4-dimensional regions of spacetime. Following this view,
a process such as an agent’s existence is defined as a region in space-
time, with its future and past are already given, and with a shape
defined by its activity, or ‘movement’.
This notion allows to solve many conundrums related to causal-
ity and agency. Indeed, causality becomes a consequence of the way
that processes are perceived, i.e. differences, as in an undifferenci-
ated view of spacetime both cause and effect participate to the same
process. By attributing “meaning” to things, by differenciating them
from the flux of becoming, we posit that difference A is cause of
difference B. Another convenient feature of four-dimensionalism, re-
garding agency, is that future states of the world (the foundation of
prevision or planning) as well as past ones (the foundation of knowl-
edge or memory) can be thought of in analogy with spatial regions.
Indeed we can extend a theory of perception (the way we perceive
our surrounding environment, a region of spacetime, for example
visually) to cognitive operations in which an agent remembers its
past (perception of a region of spacetime) or plans its future (percep-
tion of another region of spacetime). As such planning actions using
past experiences in order to realize a ‘foreseeable’ future corresponds
to perceiving (possibly wrongly) regions of space time separated in
time, i.e. a model of knowledge based planning is looking up toward
the end of the staircase while climbing stairs, and at the same time
using each stair as a support to climb higher. Models of perception
can therefore be used to derive concepts such as “plans”, “desires”,
“beliefs” of “goals”.
The second constraint imposed to spacetime is differentiation: we
should be able to consider different notions of space according to
the context. Indeed, when it comes to our experience of space, when
moving, manipulating, or reading a map, space takes very different
shapes and topologies. From the network geometry of paths in a ur-
ban environment, organized in zones and directions, to the 3 dimen-
sional spaces of buildings and individual homes, divided by walls,
connected by doors, extended by staircases and open to gardens, as
well as the smaller environment of manipulable objects, all involve
distinct types of spaces, having different topologies and geometries,
as respectively the urbanist, the architect, and the robot engineer
know. However, this differentiation should not affect the procedural
aspect of space, as spacetime, that we already established.
Interestingly the need for different topologies and geometries has
been acknowledged long ago in physical sciences. Indeed in mod-
ern physics shape is playing an essential role and older physical
abstractions related to agency, such as forces, can be reduced to it.
For example gravitational forces in the theory of general relativ-
ity are described as the action of the curvature of spacetime due to
mass/energy fields [11]. Similarly any physical interaction seems to
allow to be described in terms of curved multi-dimensional mani-
folds [22]. Moreover, as the geometry of space has become more
interesting than the absolute position of elements in it, space(time) is
often represented by a differential operator, the line element, which,
independently of the coordinate system, describes the shape of a
given space. For example the geometry of a 2 dimensional man-
ifold shaped as a sphere is described by the differential element:
dS2 = r2(dθ2 + sin2dφ2), here expressed in polar coordinates. In
the same way “All geometry can be reduced to relations between dis-
tances; all distances can be reduced to integrals of distances between
nearby points” [11] (p. 23).
We extend to agency the consequences of this procedural and
differential description of space. Indeed four-dimensionalism as ex-
pressed here provides a surprisingly good account of direct percep-
tion: in the flux of processes constituting spacetime, direct perception
of affordances is due to the fact that affordances are immediate result
of our actions, and are therefore immediately (pre)visible. According
to this theory the doorknob that affords turning is the immediate, i.e.
differential in the sense of a function derivative, link to the forseeable
future of the door being opened, which coexists with the process that
constitutes the agent’s activity (and existence). It needs to become
meaningfur, i.e. be isolated as a difference, in order to actualise this
state of the world. Also the doorknob shapes the surrounding space
for a particular agent by its affordances, allowing only a finite set of
relevant movements to the foreseeable regions of spacetime it pro-
vides access to. Perception can therefore only be direct because it
results movement, in a space presenting a given geometry allowing
the affordance, a movement not only in space+time but in spacetime,
that is oriented toward the completion of a process. Movement is
constrained by the particular shape of the environment, and move-
ment unifies both physical and cognitive operations. Similar conclu-
sion has also been reached in [23], starting from the premise that the
apparent intentionality of an agent can be explained by it following
environmental gradients.
We will now informally describe a use case and show how such a
theory of GSI can be applied to it.
5 CHANGING A LIGHT BULB
The process in which the agent is involved includes using an office
room. The spacetime region occupied by this process, as perceived
by the agent, involves switching on the light in the office, which in-
volves movement from the three dimensional flat space of entering
the room to the differently shaped and table-top like space of manip-
ulating the switch.
After acting on the switch toward the expected spacetime region
of bringing light to the room, and seeing that it does not occur, the
agent’s perception is reoriented towards a different process in space-
time, in which the process of using the office to do some work in-
volves the process of changing the light bulb.
Getting a new light bulb involves mobility in the spacetime de-
fined by the compartimented 2D of the house. In this spatial context
the agent orients itself in spacetime towards the expected spacetime
region occupied by the new light bulb. In this case a drawer in the
kitchen. Opening the drawer again involves a different space than the
one followed to reach it.
Back in the office room the process of reaching the lamp involves
the process of getting higher which involves using one of the present
elements, traditionally a desk, a chair, or a pile-of-books.
Sliding the desk to climb on it leads lets the agent to forsee a space-
time region in which there are scratches on the floor, and this space-
time region leads to another in which blame can be felt. This acts as a
negative affordance, and leads to other choices for reaching the bulb.
Eventually pushing and standing on the chair appears, involving
its own spaces (flat 2D for the push operation, 3D for standing, etc.),
while effectively changing the bulb involves a rotation with several
degrees of freedom.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have shown the need of a theory of General Spatial Intelligence,
and hinted towards one in which agents evolve and act in their space-
time environment according to the shape of differential spaces in-
duced by affordances. Future work will involve building the compu-
tational tools necessary to model spatial interactions.
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